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We study antisymmetric components of matrices characterizing pair interactions in multistrategy evolutionary
games. Based on the dyadic decomposition of matrices we distinguish cyclic and starlike hierarchical dominance
in the appropriate components. In the symmetric matrix games the strengths of these elementary components
are determined. The general features and intrinsic symmetries of these interactions are represented by directed
graphs. It is found that the variation of a single matrix component modifies simultaneously the strengths of two
starlike hierarchical basis games and many other independent rock-paper-scissors type cyclic basis games. The
application of the related concepts is illustrated by discussing the three-strategy voluntary prisoner’s dilemma.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In evolutionary games payoff matrices characterize the pair
interactions in the multiagent models describing biological
and social systems [1–7]. The evolutionary processes and
stationary states of these systems are strongly influenced by
these interactions as well as by the applied dynamical rule and
connectivity structure. For symmetric games the players are
equivalent and the interactions are defined by a single payoff
matrix A where Aij denotes the payoff of the first player if
she chooses her ith strategy while her coplayer selects the j th
one (1  i,j  n for n strategies). The classification of these
matrix interactions into different types [8,9] efficiently helps
the systematic investigation of the possible behaviors that is
complicated by the large number of payoff parameters.
The decomposition of matrices into the linear combination
of orthogonal matrices has thrown light on the inherent sym-
metries and indicated possibilities for different classifications.
For example, if the elementary orthogonal set of matrices are
built up from the dyadic products of two sets of orthogonal
basis vectors then we can easily distinguish the games with
self- and cross-dependent payoffs [10] which represent the
absence of direct pair interactions between the players. In those
cases one of the basis vectors of the dyadic products is a vector
with all components being 1. The corresponding set of matrices
is built up from rows (or columns) with uniform values; that is,
Aij = εi for the self-dependent components (or Aij = δj for
the cross-dependent games). For example, the payoff matrix
of the donation game [11] (or simplified prisoner’s dilemma
game [6]) can be composed of a self- and a cross-dependent
component. The additional orthogonal terms of the payoff
matrix can be separated into symmetric and antisymmetric
components [10]. It is found that the symmetric components
can be considered as linear combinations of coordination type
interactions between any possible strategy pairs as described
in a recent paper [12]. We have to emphasize that all these
elementary coordination games are equivalent and can be
mapped onto each other by relabeling the strategy indices.
It is worth noting that the symmetric games with symmetric
payoff matrices Aij = Aji are potential games and these
systems exhibit thermodynamical behavior if the logit rule
controls the evolution of the strategy distribution [13–18].
In that case the potential matrix is equivalent to the payoff
matrix. The latter quantity summarizes the payoff variation
of the active player when moving in the strategy space via
consecutive unilateral strategy changes. In fact, the name of
potential refers to the negative potential energy in physical
systems (like the Ising model).
The payoff matrices of the game theory, however, may
be asymmetric. At the same time all these matrices can be
decomposed into the sum of symmetric and antisymmetric
parts as A = A(s) + A(as), where A(s) = (A + AT )/2, A(as) =
(A − AT )/2, and the index T refers to transpose. Now we
study the internal structure of the antisymmetric part that
can be built up as the sum of two types of games, namely,
A(as) = A(c) + A(h), where the upper labels denote cyclic and
hierarchical dominance. These games are symmetric zero sum
games where both players receive nothing if they choose
the same strategy (A(as)ii = 0) while when selecting different
strategies one gains and the other loses an equivalent amount
(A(as)ij = −A(as)ji ). It has previously been shown that there are
(n − 1)(n − 2)/2 independent cyclic components that prevent
the existence of potential [7,9]. Now we show that the set of
rock-paper-scissors type elementary games with three suitable
strategies (namely, with 1, i, and j where strategy 1 dominates
strategy i dominating j dominating 1 with equal strength
and 1 < i < j  n) spans the parameters space of A(c). In
addition, the antisymmetric matrix interactions involve (n − 1)
starlike hierarchical components that are derived from the self-
and cross-dependent games. The latter type of interactions is
responsible for the occurrence of social dilemmas [7,11].
In the next sections we describe the possible and indepen-
dent components of the antisymmetric matrix interactions and
we show how the strengths of these independent components
can be evaluated. The general features and symmetries of
the antisymmetric elementary matrices are illustrated by an
appropriate set of directed graphs. When considering the linear
combinations of these elementary components or graphs we
get a picture about the nature of hierarchical dominance and
also about how the large number of cyclic components are
entangled.
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II. ANTISYMMETRIC COMPONENTS DERIVED
FROM DYADIC PRODUCTS
The dyadic products of an orthogonal set of n-dimensional
basis vectors [v(1),v(2), . . . ,v(n) with a scalar product v(p) ·
v(q) = 0 if p = q] serve as an orthogonal set of basis
matrices [7,9]. Consequently, any matrix A can be expressed
as
A =
n∑
p,q=1
α(p,q)
c(p,q) g(p,q), (1)
where the dyadic products
g(p,q) = v(p) ⊗ v(q) (2)
represent the orthogonal set of basis matrices with elements
gij (p,q) = vi(p)vj (q) for p,q,i,j = 1, . . . ,n. If these matri-
ces are considered as n2-dimensional vectors then the matrices
A and A′ are orthogonal to each other when their scalar product
is zero; that is, A · A′ =∑i,j AijA′ij = 0. The coefficients in
Eq. (1) can be expressed by these scalar products as
α(p,q) = A · g(p,q) (3)
and
c(p,q) = g(p,q) · g(p,q). (4)
The decomposition (1) becomes meaningful if the first
vector is chosen to be an all-ones vector (i.e., vi(1) = 1 ∀i).
In these cases the self-dependent part of A is expressed by the
sum of n terms as
A(se) =
n∑
p=1
α(p,1)
c(p,1) g(p,1) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
ε1 ε1 · · · ε1
ε2 ε2 · · · ε2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
εn εn · · · εn
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ (5)
and it is composed of rows with uniform payoffs as indicated.
The cross-dependent components A(cr) obey a similar expres-
sion, namely,
A(cr) =
n∑
q=1
α(1,q)
c(1,q) g(1,q) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
δ1 δ2 · · · δn
δ1 δ2 · · · δn
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
δ1 δ2 · · · δn
⎞
⎟⎟⎠, (6)
where the payoffs are the same in each column.
Notice that the all-ones matrix belongs to both the self- and
cross-dependent components. The corresponding term A(av)
plays a distinguished or irrelevant role and can be expressed
by the average value of payoffs. Quantitatively,
A(av) = a(av)g(1,1), where a(av) = 1
n2
∑
i,j
Aij . (7)
Consequently, the dimension of the unified self- and cross-
dependent components is 2n − 1. In the above formulas the
matrix elements are average values in the suitable row or
column; that is,
εi = 1
n
∑
j
Aij and δi = 1
n
∑
j
Aji, (8)
which satisfy additional criteria:
a(av) = 1
n
∑
i
εi = 1
n
∑
i
δi . (9)
First we discuss the hierarchical component A(h) derived
from the self- and cross-dependent games as
A(h) = 1
2
(A(se) + A(cr) − A(se)T − A(cr)T). (10)
Evidently the symmetric A(av) does not give contribution to
A(h). The proper structures of A(se) and A(cr) imply the selection
of a more suitable set of basis games that can also be expressed
by dyadic products as
H(p) = u(p) ⊗ v(1) − v(1) ⊗ u(p), (11)
where u(p) (p = 1, . . . ,n) are the traditional Cartesian unit
vectors [with components ui(p) = δip defined by the Kro-
necker delta]. For this elementary game the player wins 1 from
her coplayer if she chooses the pth strategy and the coplayer
chooses any other strategies while both players receive zero
otherwise. In matrix notation
H(1) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 1 1 · · · 1
−1 0 0 · · · 0
−1 0 0 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−1 0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(12)
and all the other H(p) matrices can be obtained by exchanging
the first and pth rows and columns of H(1) simultaneously. The
pure Nash equilibrium of this potential game is to choose the
pth strategy for both players when each gets zero payoff.
The self- and cross-dependent games are potential
games [7,10] for which one can derive a potential matrix V
summarizing the individual interest for consecutive unilateral
strategy changes. One can easily check that the potential
matrix of H(p) can be expressed by Kronecker deltas as
V
(h)
ij (p) = δipδjp.
The matrices H(p) are not orthogonal to each other because
H(p) · H(p′) = −2 if p = p′, whereas all these H(p) matrices
are orthogonal to the symmetric parts of A and to the cyclic
components discussed later. The scalar product of A and H(p)
depends only on the payoff parameters εp − δp because
ep = 1
n
H(p) · A = 1
n
H(p) · A(h)
= 1
n
∑
i
(εp − εi + δi − δp)
= εp − δp (13)
and ep quantifies the asymmetry and it is equivalent to the
average payoff the player wins with using the pth strategy from
the other player selecting her strategy at random. Evidently,
∑
p
ep = 0. (14)
The positive or negative ep refers to a greedy or losing
strategy and this quantity can rank the strategies from the
viewpoint of greediness.
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The whole set of the H(p) matrices are not independent of
each other because
n∑
p=1
H(p) = 0. (15)
On the other hand, any (n − 1) terms of these H(p) matrices
span the space of hierarchical games A(h). The reader can
easily check that the hierarchical component is given as a
linear combination of all H(p) matrices; that is,
A(h) = 1
2
n∑
p=1
epH(p). (16)
In this expression Eq. (14) ensures that the number of
independent parameters remains (n − 1). Using Eq. (15),
however, one can derive other linear combinations for A(h).
For example,
A(h) = 1
2
n∑
p=1
(ep − μ)H(p) (17)
may also be a suitable expression. In that case, the sum of
the prefactors differs from zero if μ = 0. On the other hand,
if μ = ej then the contribution of H(j ) is replaced by other
components in agreement with Eq. (15).
The above simple formulas are related to the fact that the
H(p) basis games are described by sparse matrices. Now
we exploit the same feature in the analysis of the cyclic
components.
In the notation of dyadic decomposition [7,10] the coor-
dination (A(co)) and cyclic (A(cy)) components of symmetric
matrix games are defined as
A(co) =
n∑
p,q
1<p<q
β(p,q)[g(p,q) + g(q,p)] (18)
and
A(cy) =
n∑
p,q
1<p<q
γ (p,q)[g(p,q) − g(q,p)], (19)
where
β(p,q) = 1
2c(p,q) [α(p,q) + α(q,p)],
γ (p,q) = 1
2c(p,q) [α(p,q) − α(q,p)].
The matrices A(co) and A(cy) are orthogonal to each other as
well as to the self- and cross-dependent components defined
by Eqs. (5) and (6). Previous analysis has justified that for
n = 3 we have only one cyclic component that is equivalent to
the rock-paper-scissors game [9], while for n = 4, A(cy) can be
built up as a linear combination of three rock-paper-scissors
type interactions [10]. For the latter case one can find a
fourth rock-paper-scissors component and also two additional
four-strategy cyclic games. The latter feature is related to the
inherent symmetry resembling the three-dimensional cubic
lattices where we have four equivalent (space diagonal) unit
vectors.
Now we show algebraically that for n strategies we can
introduce (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 rock-paper-scissors type compo-
nents that span the subspace of cyclic components. The
corresponding matrices are denoted by C(1,k,l) and describe
rock-paper-scissors type cyclic dominance among the denoted
three strategies; that is,
Cij (1,k,l) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if i = 1 and j = k
1 if i = k and j = l
1 if i = l and j = 1
−1 if j = 1 and i = k
−1 if j = k and i = l
−1 if j = l and i = 1
0 otherwise,
(20)
where 1 < k < l  n. Although some of the C(1,k,l) matrices
are not orthogonal to each other [e.g., C(1,k,l) · C(1,k,l′)2],
their linear combinations obey the following simple form:
n∑
k,l
1<k<l
νklC(1,k,l) =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 2 3 · · · n
−2 0 ν23 · · · ν2n
−3 −ν23 0 · · · ν3n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
−n −ν2n −ν3n · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
(21)
where
k =
k∑
l=2
νkl −
n∑
l=k+1
νkl. (22)
Notice that in the above linear combination the basis matrix
C(1,k,l) gives a contribution νkl exclusively to A(cy)kl if 1 <
k < l  n, and the values of k (in the first row and column of
A(cy)) ensure that the sum of the matrix elements is zero in each
row and column. That means that A(cy)kl = νkl (1 < k < l  n),
and this expression gives us a simple method for the identi-
fication of the coefficients νkl in the knowledge of the cyclic
component A(cy).
III. GRAPH REPRESENTATION
Directed graphs [19] can be used to illustrate the general
features of the symmetric zero-sum games because their
adjacency matrices define a suitable set of basis matrices.
In the simplest case the graphs G(i,j ) with n nodes and
a single directed edge from the ith node to the j th one
(see Fig. 1) represent a natural set of basis matrices or games
where the matrix elements of the adjacency matrices are zero
except when Gij (i,j ) = −Gji(i,j ) = 1. Henceforth, we use
calligraphic letters (e.g.,G) to indicate a directed graph defined
by an antisymmetric adjacency matrix G.
In this notation the antisymmetric part of the payoff matrix
is given as A(as) =∑i,j A(as)ij G(i,j ). In fact, the matrix A(as)
can be considered as the adjacency matrix of a weighted
directed graph where Aij quantifies the weight of the given
directed edge. If all the directions of existing edges are reversed
in a directed graph G then the sign of the adjacency matrix is
reversed, e.g., G(i,j ) → G(j,i) = −G(i,j ).
The adjacency matrices G(i,j ) (with 1  i < j  n) define
a complete orthogonal basis for A(as). In the previous section
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FIG. 1. Set of directed graphs G(i,j ) with a single directed edge from the node i to node j .
we have shown that instead of this natural basis we can use
another complete set of basis matrices composed of H(p)
(1 < p  n) and C(1,k,l) (1 < k < l  n) that can also be
represented by directed graphs, as illustrated in Figs. 2 and 3.
The hierarchical basis matrix H(p) is identical to the
adjacency matrix of a directed starlike graph H(p) which has
directed edges from the pth node to all the others.
These graphs (as well as their adjacency matrices) can be
considered as a suitable sum of the graphs G(i,j ). To be more
quantitative, now the sum of two directed graphs (G andG ′ with
the same labeled nodes) is defined by combining the two sets
of edges. In this approach the opposite edges annihilate each
other and parallel edges are doubled. The reader can check that
the sum of the starlike hierarchical graphs, plotted in Fig. 2,
results in an empty graph (with n nodes without edges).
The application of this summation rule is visualized in
Fig. 4, which shows how any directed loop (or the sum of
directed loops) can be built up from a suitable combination
of those directed three-edge loops including node 1 (plotted
in Fig. 3).
In words, directed three-edge loops are obtained by con-
necting both ends of each edge of a directed loop to node 1
and the ingoing and outgoing edges of node 1 will annihilate
each other in the corresponding sum of the resulted directed
triangles.
We emphasize that the numbers of three- and n-edge
directed loops are significantly larger than the number of
the independent basis cyclic graphs C(1,i,j ). The cyclic
graphs are entangled via their common edges. Thus if the
system contains only a single basis cyclic component [e.g.,
C(1,2,3)] then there appear many other cyclic components
[e.g., C(1,2,k), C(1,k,3), and C(k,2,3), with k > 3] that
influence the evolutionary processes.
For all the possible combinations of the directed three-
edge loops C(1,i,j ) the numbers of ingoing and outgoing
edges are equivalent for each node. This feature ensures the
orthogonality of the corresponding adjacency matrices to both
A(se) and A(cr) from which the starlike hierarchical basis graphs
(see Fig. 2) are derived. Thus we can speak of two orthogonal
graphs if the scalar product of their adjacency matrices is
zero. In this sense the single-edge graphs plotted in Fig. 1
are orthogonal to each other. Similarly, each starlike graph
(see Fig. 2) is orthogonal to any other cyclic graphs plotted in
Figs. 3 and 4.
The concept of the complete independent set of basis
matrices can be adapted to introduce the complete and
independent set of basis graphs from which any directed
graph can be constructed by linear combinations. Indeed, the
single-edge directed graphs (see Fig. 1) serve as a standard
choice.
In Fig. 5 we show that any single edge graph G(i,j ) can be
considered as a sum of H(p) and C(i,j,k) graphs.
More accurately, Fig. 5 illustrates the graph representation
of the relation
nG(i,j ) = H(i) − H(j ) +
∑
k
k =i,j
C(i,j,k) (23)
that becomes correct when allowing multiple or weighted
edges in the set of directed graphs. This formula obeys the
following form:
nG(i,j ) = H(i) − H(j ) + (n − 2)C(1,i,j )
+
∑
k
k =1,j,k
[C(1,k,i) + C(1,k,j )] (24)
if all the three-edge cyclic graphs C(i,j,k) are built up only
from those ones containing node 1 (see Fig. 4), that is, when
substituting the expression C(i,j,k) = C(1,i,j ) + C(1,k,i) +
C(1,j,k) into Eq. (23). Consequently, all the directed graphs
can also be composed of the basis graphs H(p) and C(1,i,j ).
In game theory the main message of Eq. (23) and Fig. 5
is that the variation of A(as)ij is shared equally among two
hierarchical and (n − 2) cyclic components including the
strategies i and j .
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FIG. 2. Directed graphs representing starlike hierarchical dominance. Except for one of them these graphs define (n − 1) independent
(nonorthogonal) basis games H(p).
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FIG. 3. Directed three-edge loops including node 1 define (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 independent cyclic basis games C(1,i,j ) as described in the
text.
IV. EXAMPLE: VOLUNTARY PRISONER’S DILEMMA
Now we demonstrate the evaluation of the strengths of
the hierarchical and cyclic dominance by considering a well-
investigated symmetric three-strategy game. The example is
the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma which is already studied
for well-mixed populations and also on lattices and different
networks [20–22]. In these games the players have three
strategies: D (defection), C (cooperation), and L (loner).
Following the traditional notation of social dilemmas [3,11],
the payoff matrix is defined by three parameters [22] as
A =
⎛
⎝
0 T σ
S 1 σ
σ σ σ
⎞
⎠. (25)
If the players are constrained to use only the first (D) and
second (C) strategies then the game is equivalent to the
prisoner’s dilemma. In the latter case both rational players
are enforced to choose D providing zero income (as it is the
single pure Nash equilibrium), whereas for mutual cooperation
both players would receive a higher income considered as a
payoff unit. The “tragedy of the commons” [23,24] is caused
by the high value of temptation (T > 1) to choose defection
against the cooperative coplayer who receives a low sucker’s
payoff (S < 0). A large portion of papers in the literature
of evolutionary game theory study methods developed to
avoid this social dilemma. One of the suggested methods
is related to the voluntary participation [20,21] in the game
via the introduction of the third strategy L. Accordingly,
if one of the players chooses L then both receive σ with
0 < σ < 1 [22].
The symmetric part of this payoff matrix predicts the
CC strategy pair to be the preferred Nash equilibrium if
(T + S)/2 < 1 [7]. In the opposite case [(T + S)/2 < 1] the
game has two equivalent Nash equilibria (DC and CD)
characteristic of the anticoordination games. It is worth noting
that the strategy pair LL is a weak Nash equilibrium with a
low value of potential; therefore, it plays an irrelevant role in
the multiagent evolutionary game if the evolution is controlled
by logit rule for a low noise level.
The curiosity of these three-strategy systems is that both
the social dilemma and the presence of a cyclic component
are caused by a single pair of nonvanishing matrix elements of
A(as) that is given as
A(as) = T − S
2
⎛
⎝
0 1 0
−1 0 0
0 0 0
⎞
⎠. (26)
Figure 5 indicates that
A(as) = T − S
6
(H(1) − H(2) + C(1,2,3)). (27)
The hierarchical components [H(1) − H(2)] enforce the play-
ers to choose D. The corresponding greediness parameters
e1 = −e2 = T − S3 and e3 = 0 (28)
indicate that the first strategy represents the greedy behavior,
the second strategy plays the role of sucker, whereas the third
one is neutral.
In this model the introduction of the third (loner) strategy is
accompanied by the relevant presence of a rock-paper-scissors
component that prevents the existence of potential as well as
the thermodynamic behavior of this evolutionary game for
the application of a logit rule. For imitation type dynamical
rules [3,4] the multiagent voluntary prisoner’s dilemma on a
square lattice exhibited a self-organizing pattern with rotating
spiral arms [22,25,26]. In well-mixed populations [21,27] and
also on some small-world networks [28–30] this interaction
yielded global oscillations in the strategy frequencies. The
“tragedy of the commons” is avoided in all these systems
because the cyclic component supports the survival of all
three strategies. Similar phenomena were reported in many
models developed to explain the maintenance of biodiversity
[4,31–36].
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FIG. 4. Any directed loop can be considered as a sum of directed triangles involving node 1. In the sum of directed graphs coinciding two
edges with opposite directions annihilate each other.
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FIG. 5. The sum of two starlike directed graphs [H(i) −H(j )] and (n − 2) directed triangles [C(i,j,k) with k = i,j and i < j ]. Notice that
all these elementary graphs possess a directed edge from node i to j .
In most of these systems the effect of cyclic dominance is
affected weakly by the additional terms of interaction. Now
we recall only a paradoxical effect described by Tainaka [37].
The increase of T is beneficial for the first strategy; therefore,
naively one can expect an increase in the defector population,
too. Instead of it, both the numerical simulations on different
networks and the analytical calculations predict an increase
in the frequency of loners [22,26], in agreement with the
explanation given in [37].
V. SUMMARY
The concept of the decomposition of the n-strategy sym-
metric matrix games into the sum of elementary basis games
has opened ways for the classification of interactions deter-
mining the noise-dependent stationary states in multiagent
evolutionary games. Mathematically this decomposition is
equivalent to a suitable rotation of the coordinate system
in the n2-dimensional parameter space when the new basis
matrices reflect well the inherent symmetries and features
of interactions. Using this tool we can improve our picture
of the effect of interactions on the final stationary state
in complex systems [38] (including biology, economics,
sociology, psychology, etc.) where these types of interactions
are entangled.
Now our analyses are focused on the investigation of
the antisymmetric parts of the payoff matrices quantifying
the n-strategy zero sum games. Two fundamentally different
types of antisymmetric basis matrices are distinguished. The
hierarchical components are derived from the self- and cross-
dependent games defined by matrices with uniform values in
rows and columns. This subset of games is spanned by (n − 1)
hierarchical basis games that are equivalent to the adjacency
matrices of starlike directed graphs.
The set of independent cyclic components is defined
by rock-paper-scissors type games for three of n strategies
selected in a way that one of the distinguished strategies
is included in all the (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 independent cyclic
components. The matrices of these elementary games are
identical to adjacency matrices of directed graphs with n nodes
and a directed three-edge loop.
The intimate relationship between the antisymmetric ma-
trices and directed graphs is used to demonstrate the inherent
structure and symmetries hidden in interactions described
by antisymmetric matrices. The graph representation has
illustrated clearly the entanglement of loops and also how the
large number of possible directed loops can be decomposed
into independent elementary three-edge loops. Additionally,
the graph representation has shown that the variation of a
matrix element is accompanied by a change in two hierarchical
and many other cyclic elementary components.
Although these matrices are not orthogonal to each other we
could determine the strength of the independent components
for a given payoff matrix. This calculation is simplified by
the fact that the elementary games are described by sparse
matrices.
In game theory the separation of the cyclic and hierarchical
components can help us extract general relationships between
the different types of interactions and their consequences
in the macroscopic behavior. It is already known [7] that
the hierarchical components are responsible for the possible
emergence of social dilemmas in the n-strategy potential
games whereas the presence of cyclic components prevents the
existence of potential as well as the related thermodynamical
behavior for the application of logit rules. Now, the voluntary
prisoner’s dilemma game is selected to demonstrate the
applicability of the present approach in the anatomy of games.
We emphasize, however, that many concepts and aspects of
this decomposition can be adapted for the exploration of other
systems characterized by directed graphs.
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